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FAIR SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITY? 
Therese Lia 
1. Introduction to the Dublin III Regulation
The Dublin Regulation,1265 replacing the 1990 Dublin Convention as one of the
'cornerstones of the European Union's (Hereinafter referred to as 'EU') internal 
security acquis'1266, assigns the responsibility for asylum claims to the different
Member States (usually the country of first entry), in order to ensure the fair 
examination of each asylum claim and maintain an efficient system. The Dublin 
III Regulation and its amendment brought about the right to information, 
personal interview and access to remedies as well as a mechanism for early 
warning and crisis management. The Dublin III Regulation also provides more 
protection to asylum seekers who may be considered as irregular migrants to be 
treated under the Dublin Procedure and it creates more legally clear procedures 
between Member States. 
Although the Dublin III Regulation grants more protection to those considered 
irregular migrants and to the migrants' family links, 1267 the Dublin Regulation 
lacks a mechanism which guarantees a fair distribution of responsibilities. This 
is because its underlying premise stipulates that the State that played the major 
part in the asylum seekers' entry into, or stay in the EU (taking account of his or 
her personal situation), is responsible for the asylum application. As the Draft 
Report on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU 
ms Council Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) (2013) OJ L 180/31 
1266 Carolyn Armstrong and Eiko Thielemann, 'The Political Project of the European Union: 
Current State and Future Perspectives' (Universidade Nova de Lisboa 2011) 
<http://itl.pt/file/uploads/197fd7e390a506f0c6f2b14efa50be5d.pdf> accessed 9 May 
2016. 
1267 The Regulation contains a 'sovereignty clause' allowing a Member State receiving an 
application to take responsibility for an asylum application even if not otherwise 
responsible (Article 3(2)) and a 'humanitarian clause' providing that a State may unite 
"family members as well as other dependent relatives" on humanitarian grounds by taking 
responsibility for an asylum seeker which does not fall under that MS's responsibility 
(Article 15 (2)). 
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approach on migration stated,1268 the Dublin III Regulation has 'raised many
questions linked to fairness and solidarity',1269 since 'the current system does 
not take into sufficient consideration the particular migratory pressure faced by 
Member States situated at the Union's external borders•.1270
2. Are the EU's core principles of solidarity and unity being faithfully
represented in the Dublin System?
The European Commission has claimed that 'Solidarity is part of how European 
society works .. :1271 In fact, solidarity, one of the EU core fundamental values to
which the Member States subscribe to,1272 is of utmost importance to the policy
of the EU, which came about from the conscious effort to create some kind of 
unity in Western Europe after two subsequent wars. In this respect, after ten 
years in force, the European Commission's evaluation: 'the objectives of the 
Dublin system ... have, to a large extent, been achieved', is questionable. 
Responsibility, though assigned, is not being carried out, multiple claims and 
irregular movement are still commonplace and bureaucracy overshadows the 
European asylum system. The 'main problem' as identified by the Commission is 
the low transfer rates (which are rarely even carried out).1273 The Commission's
suggestion that Member States should annul 'the exchange of equal numbers of 
asylum seekers in well-defined circumstances' is absurd; disregarding sharing of 
responsibility should never be seen as a 'solution'.1274 If it does in fact improve
the efficiency of the system, then how successful is the whole system in terms of 
fair burden-sharing,1275 and inter-state solidarity, which are supposedly the
rationale behind the European asylum policy? 
1268 
1269 
1270 
1271 
1272 
1273 
1274 
1275 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 'Draft Report on the situation in the 
Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration' (2015) 
2015/2095(1NI). 
ibid 14. 
ibid. 
Malcolm Ross and Yuri Borgmann-Prebil, Promoting Solidarity In The European Union (OUP 
2010). 
Eurofund, 'Solidarity Principle' 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations­
dictionary /solidarity-principle> accessed 11 May 2016. 
The criteria established by the said Regulation are not always applied correctly or at all 
since complete and conformity with the criteria would not bring about the desired results. 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 'Sharing Responsibility For Refugee Protection In 
Europe: Dublin Reconsidered' (2008). 
Fair burden-sharing is also not being achieved in financial terms. This Regulation may be 
criticised for not sorting out the issue of multiple applications and for having a significant 
negative financial impact. (In spite of the assertion that 'Member States consider the 
fulfilling of the political objectives of the system as very important, regardless of its financial 
implications'.) 
Source: Commission, 'Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the evaluation of the Dublin system' COM (2007) 299 final. 
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According to the EU Observer, the EU's mantras of values and inter-state 
cooperation have been rendered meaningless in the refugee crisis.1276 The
Dublin system is guilty of shifting responsibility of refugees towards Europe's 
southern and Eastern States such as Greece, Jordan, Turkey, and Italy, which 
have been experiencing an overwhelming economic strain. Greece has in fact 
hosted 154,553 asylum seekers between January and April 2016 alone.1277 With 
the insufficiencies of these migration centres including lack of space, and 
hygienic and health services, becoming more problematic, many rights groups 
have invoked Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which cites 
the unlawfulness of 'inhuman or degrading treatment'. The situations are 
especially dire in Greece where lack of ventilation, access to clean water, and 
sanitation are punishing the overcrowded facilities.127s In the case of M.S.S vs. 
Belgium and Greece,1279 the applicant, an Afghan national entering Greece
before arriving in Belgium, complained in particular about the conditions of his 
detention and his living conditions in Greece, which was held to be responsible 
according to the Dublin II Regulation. As the European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (Hereinafter referred to as 'ECRE') puts it in Sharing Responsibility for 
Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered: 'The inefficiencies and 
contradictions of the Dublin system do not merely impact governments and 
public finances, but often harshly disrupt human lives as well.'12so The hotspots
set up in Italy and Greece, the first reception facilities accommodating large 
numbers of migrants in place for the purposes of identification, registration and 
fingerprinting present an unfair sharing of responsibilities, costs and efforts, 12s1
since Greece and Italy are responsible for the establishment of the hotspots even 
though they receive financial aid from the Eu.12s2
1276 
1277 
1278 
1279 
1280 
1281 
1282 
Nikolai Nielsen, 'EU Mantra of 'Solidarity' Lost on Asylum' (euobserver) 
<https://euobserver.com/migration/131966> accessed 9 May 2016. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 'UNHCR Refugees/Migrants Emergency 
Response Mediterranean' (2016) 
<http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83> accessed 20 May 2016. 
Khalid Koser, Deputy Director of the Geneva Centre of Security Policy, says: 'We used to 
think of migration as a human security issue: protecting people and providing assistance. 
Now we clearly perceive-or misperceive-migration as a national security issue. And the 
risk of securitizing migration is that you risk legitimizing extraordinary responses'. 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 30696/09 (2011). 
"States increasingly detain asylum seekers to try to complete transfers, families are kept 
apart, and refugees with serious health problems receive insufficient care. The application of 
the Dublin rules causes additional, unnecessary suffering to already traumatised refugees." 
(Source: ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles), 'Sharing Responsibility For 
Refugee Protection In Europe: Dublin Reconsidered' (2008)) 
Commission, 'The Hotspot Approach To Managing Exceptional Migratory Flows' 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda­
migration/background-information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf> accessed 15 May 2016. 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 'Sharing Responsibility For Refugee Protection In 
Europe: Dublin Reconsidered' (2008). 
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It is against the EU's policies for migrants to continue onward after Greece or 
Italy since the Dublin Regulation imposes the obligation on the receiving country 
to process the asylum claims. In light of this, the Commission proposed a scheme 
to have 20,000 resettlement places from Italy and Greece.1283 The rationale
behind the Commission's two-year plan of relocation was to reduce the 
difficulties state which are geographically disadvantaged face due to this global 
phenomenon by collectively combining efforts to have a holistic EU approach to 
migration. However, the majority of Member States have stressed that this 
scheme should be done voluntarily; proving the lack of inter-state cooperation 
in the current system. The implementation of the relocation scheme has brought 
about even greater tension between the States. On the 4th February 2016, the 
Commission announced that only 937 of the intended asylum seekers had been 
located from Italy and Greece.12s4
The differences in the number of asylum applications Member States receive are 
significant. So is the fact that Member States deal with such applications 
differently in terms of reception and living conditions, length and quality of 
asylum process, and recognition rates,12ss even though there are standards 
governing the treatment of asylum applications stipulated in binding EU 
directives.1286 A brief look at the data on the actual asylum applications reveals a
highly inequitable distribution of responsibilities between Member States and 
substantial differences between the Commission's proposed quotas for 
relocating migrants from Greece and Italy and the additional quotas later in 
September 2015. This goes to show that the Dublin procedure is not being 
successful in ensuring that the influx and strain are being shared accordingly. 
1283 
1284 
1285 
1286 
Commission Recommendation C(2015) 3560 final on a European resettlement scheme 
[2015]. 
Commission, 'Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The 
European Council And The Council First Report On Relocation And Resettlement' 
(Communication) COM(2016) 416 final. 
Steffen Angenendt, Marcus Engler and Jan Schneider, 'European Refugee Policy Pathways to 
Fairer Burden-Sharing' [2013] SWP. 
Namely the Qualification Directive 2011/95, the Procedure Directive 2013/32, and the 
Reception Directive 2013/33 
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Number of migrants EU countries are being asked to take 
a May 2015: Proposed quotas for relocating migrants from Greece and Italy 
• Sept 2015: Proposed additional quotas for relocating migrants from Greece. Italy 
and Hungary 
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Figure 1: Number of migrants EU countries are being asked to take 
(Source: BBC) 
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Figure 2: Actual asylum applications in relation to the multi-factor model 
(Source: Eurostat, UNHCR) 
The Dutch Research and Documentation Centre's study found that the 
recognition rates in the EU vary substantively, even after these had been fixed to 
suit the asylum populations in the European states.12s?. This has in turn led to 
tensions within the EU. Vastly differing refugee recognition rates create an 
'asylum lottery': for instance, over 80% of Iraqi asylum claims are accepted at 
first instance in some Member States, whilst in others they are not. 
3. How can the Dublin III Regulation be amended to ensure a fair
sharing of responsibility?
In light of these unequitable differences, one should consider the establishment 
of a permanent responsibility-sharing mechanism, founded upon the principle of 
inter-state cooperation. As the European Refugee Policy Paper12ss states, 
1287 
1288 
Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 'How (Un)Restrictive Are We? 'Adjusted' And 'Expected' 
Asylum Recognition Rates In Europe' (Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) 2015) 
<http://www.arjenleerkes.nl/How%20(un)restrictive%20are%20we%20-
%20Adjusted%20and%20expected%20asylum%20recognition%20rates%20in%20Europe 
.pdf> accessed 25 May 2016. 
Steffen Angenendt, Marcus Engler and Jan Schneider, 'European Refugee Policy Pathways to 
Fairer Burden-Sharing' [2013] SWP. 
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In view of these deficits, the EU member states need to find a new and 
fairer mechanism for rece1vmg refugees and processing their 
applications. One obvious route would be to specify an equitable 
reception quota for each member-state, to be adjusted annually 
according to a transparent calculation method. 
The European legal framework must hence be adjusted. Article 80 TFEU, which 
states that the asylum policy of the EU is based on the principle of solidarity and 
burden-sharing, needs to clearly delineate the content and meaning of 
'solidarity'. Solidarity must be defined in terms of an international sphere and its 
binding power over States that must commit to the system of collective decision­
making. 
An equitable distribution mechanism should not be the exception, as was the 
case in the Commission's two-year plan of relocation, but the normal procedure. 
In light of this, Articles 3 and 13 of the Dublin Regulation require further 
revision in order to provide for the disproportionately large number of asylum 
seekers some Member States are confronted with, in which case it should 
authorise the compulsory transfer of a set quota of asylum seekers to a Member 
State which has a disproportionately low number of asylum seekers taking into 
consideration other factors such as the latter Member State's economy and 
population density.1289 The problem with the Commission's two year relocation 
plan was the level of commitment Member States were willing to put in due to 
political difficulties with regard to burden-sharing for refugees. 1290 Thus if such
a scheme is to work as Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and 
Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos highlighted, Member States need to deliver 
their commitments, as 'The lack of political will among Member States has been 
the most important factor in slowing down the process:1291 
The Council of Ministers should be given the power to implement a distribution 
key for a fair quota plan, which can be similar to the Commission's 2015 
1289 
1290 
1291 
Although such a proposal may limit the freedom of the asylum seeker to pick and choose a 
specific Member State, this lack of choice can be compensated by offering the prospect of 
mobility within the EU for persons who acquired international protection in one of the 
Member States, after a two-year period instead of five and subject to certain restrictions, 
such as an offer to work or possibility to study in another Member State. 
Jon Henley, 'EU Refugee Relocation Scheme Is Inadequate And Will Continue To Fail' (the 
Guardian, 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/04/eu-refugee­
relocation-scheme-inadequate-will-continue-to-fail> accessed 18 November 2016 (For 
exact figures see: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european­
agenda-migration/ press-material/ docs/ state_ of_play _ -_relocation_ en. pdt) 
'Relocation And Resettlement: EU Member States Urgently Need To Deliver' (Europa.eu, 
2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re1ease_IP-16-829_en.htm> accessed 18 November 
2016 
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relocation scheme,1292 and which will annually determine the percentage of the
total number of asylum applications each Member State should be responsible 
of. This can be done after the Commission has quarterly reports by EURODAc1293 
on the total number of asylum seekers registered in the EU and in each Member 
State in order to determine which States have received a disproportionate 
number of applications, and how many asylum seekers may be transferred by 
these Member States to those with disproportionately few applications,1294 
whilst taking into consideration factors such as the countries' resources, GDP, 
economic activity, unemployment levels, population density and future 
economic growth.1295 A Member State may also indicate to the Commission a
sudden rise of asylum applications for it to thus initiate the distribution 
mechanisms ad hoc. Such a system would serve as an incentive for Member 
States to register asylum seekers into EURODAC, as the more they register, the 
sooner they will reach their allocated number of asylum seekers, allowing the 
transfer for new asylum seekers to other Member States. 
As previously stated although in terms of responsibility, the Commission's 
proposal has been seen as a step in the right direction, the efficiency of States to 
fulfil their obligations has been 'disappointing'.1296 In light of this a more
strategic enforcement approach for the Member States failing to meet their 
obligations is required by the Commission. This can be done by rewarding States 
that take active measures to increase asylum capacity with extra funding, whilst 
excluding the States which fail to meet their obligations from benefitting from 
the distribution mechanism. This can take the form of a 'Dublin compensation 
fund' which would be comprised of funds from Member States that repeatedly 
take in fewer asylum-seekers than their fair quota suggests, to set up a 
supplementary financial compensation arrangement. This fund can be similar to 
the new Asylum and Migration Fund 2014-2020, which provides a similar 
compensation mechanism for EU resettlement measures.1297 Moreover, even
1292 
1293 
1294 
1295 
1296 
1297 
Commission Recommendation C(2015) 3560 final on a European resettlement scheme 
[2015] 
"The objective of this regulation is to establish a system for comparing fingerprints of 
asylum seekers" (Eur-Lex) 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 'Sharing Responsibility For Refugee Protection In 
Europe: Dublin Reconsidered' (2008). 
The UNHCR has developed a multi-factor model for calculating reception quotas based on 
the economic strength of the country (Gross domestic product), the population (Average 
mean of last 5 years), the area (geographical area in square kilometres) and the 
unemployment rate average over the last five years. Such a multi-factor model can be used 
in order to determine said quotas. 
'Roberta Metsola Maps Out EU Plan On Migration' (EPP Group, 19 January 2016) 
<http://www.eppgroup.eu/news/Roberta-Metsola-maps-out-EU-plan-on-migration> 
accessed 11 May 2016. 
Steffen Angenendt, Marcus Engler and Jan Schneider, 'European Refugee Policy Pathways to 
Fairer Burden-Sharing' [2013] SWP. 
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though it is the Member States' primary responsibility to implement EU 
legislation correctly and in a timely fashion, the EU should intervene so as to 
hold countries responsible in Council meetings. It is important to point out that 
for the permanent distribution mechanism to operate effectively there must be 
further harmonization of the Common European Asylum system as well as a 
revision of the Temporary Protection Directive.129a
4. Is amending the Dublin Ill Regulation enough?
In tangent with amending the Dublin III Regulation, there must be further 
integration strategies for the asylum seekers, as well as better safety measures 
in the Mediterranean Sea, and more emphasis on the external dimension of EU 
asylum policies. These all require a sense of fair burden-sharing which has been 
lacking in both the Dublin III Regulation as well as the European asylum 
procedure as a whole. As the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs' Report pointed out, Article 80 TFEU puts the principles of solidarity and 
fair sharing at the heart of the whole of the EU. This solidarity can have both an 
internal dimension including the proactive interpretation of the Dublin III 
Regulation and the Temporary Protection Directive, operational support 
measures and mutual relocation whilst the external dimension can feature 
sharing of responsibilities in search and rescue missions , in cooperating with 
third countries, amongst others .. 1299
After 3771 persons were reported dead or missing in the Mediterranean Sea in 
2015, it became clear that there needs to be further cooperation between 
Member States in terms of disembarkation procedure and search and rescue.Boo 
There must hence be more harmonization on the modalities for managing 
search and rescue zones and on the obligations of the State in whose search and 
rescue zone the rescue took place.1301 Upon the recommendation of the Advisory 
Committee on Migration Affairs, the EU should work more on the external 
dimension of EU asylum by (i) cooperating with border countries and (ii) 
dealing with the main reason for which persons flee Europe. 
1290 Council Directive 2001/55/EC 
1299 The EU may provide incentives and support for measures taken by Member States to 
promote the integration of legally resident migrants however there is currently a lack of 
harmonisation of national laws and regulations. 
noo Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 'Draft Report on the situation in the 
Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration' (2015) 
2015/2095(INI). 
Bo1 It is important to note that saving lives is not only an ethical issue and an act of solidarity, 
but also a legal obligation since Article 98 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the 
Sea ratified by all Member States and the Union itself, entails assistance to be given to any 
person distress at sea. 
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4.1 Cooperation with border countries 
Whilst noting that Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq are countries which have 
recognition rates of over 50% in EU States, further cooperation with border 
countries such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon seems to be essential to relieve 
some of the weight off the EU (whilst aiding such countries in order to have 
better asylum procedures and more harmonized asylum policy). In this respect, 
although agreements such as the EU-Turkey Joint Action, the EU-Jordan 
Association Agreement,1302 and the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement have 
been helpful in this regard, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(Hereinafter referred to as 'GAMM') Pillar needs to be further developed so that 
there is greater involvement of third countries, so that the resettlement 
component of programmes ( such as the Regional Protection Programmes 
(Hereinafter referred to as 'RPP's')) or Regional Development and Protection 
Programmes (Hereinafter referred to as 'RDPPs') are strengthened, and capacity 
building efforts and resettlement activities are improved and carried out with 
the countries hosting large refugee populations. 
4.2 The sustainable development of the countries of origin 
The sustainable development of the countries of origin, which some have 
referred to as a new 'Marshall Plan' for the Middle East and North Africa, could 
ultimately help the situation since prevention measures alone are not sufficient 
to deal with this current migration phenomena.1303 As the UK Government has
recognized: 'the solution to the crisis does not lie only in resettling and meeting 
the basic needs of existing refugees' since there must be 'further focus on 
interventions in source countries that build resilience, increase stability and 
enhance development in order to help reduce further mass migration'.1304 The 
EU must hence adopt a long-term strategy to help counteract the 'push factor' in 
1302 
1303 
1304 
'King Abdullah: !SIL "A war inside of Islam" that we need to fight together (Euronews, 11 
November 2015) <http:/ /www.euronews.com/2015/11/11/exclusive-king-abdullah-ii-on­
syrian-refugees-in-jordan-and-the-islamic-state> accessed 25 May 2016:' .. .I think the issue 
of refugees arriving on the shores of Europe has been a wake-up call for all of us that we 
have to have better coordination ... I think here is the opportunity to put our differences 
aside and bring this new collective relationship together ... ... Are we going to grab those 
opportunities or are we going to stick our heads in the sands and let these opportunities 
take us past? It is up to us.' 
'Tackling Migration's Root Causes' (British Council, October 2015) 
<https://www.britishcouncil.org/organisation/policy-insight-research/insight/tackling­
migrations-root-causes> accessed 9 May 2016. 
The UK's interventions vary from contributing to systematic reform in key countries; 
through boosting education and increasing employability. Ways of contributing to the 
sustainable development of said countries could be to boost the private sector, to promote 
economic growth, develop state capacity, as well as strengthen the rule of law and 
mechanisms of accountability (US academic Francis Fukayama) as well as strengthening and 
forcing asylum systems and helping in border control. 
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third countries (persecution, conflict, violence or extreme poverty) and to solve 
the geo-political issues that force people to flee, such as the Syrian war; the lack 
of employability in sub-Saharan Africa; and the deep-rooted conflicts in Nigeria, 
Sudan, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo. Bos
5. Final suggestions and Conclusion
To sum up the suggestions that have been given in this paper are the following, 
a) The establishment of a permanent-sharing mechanism;
b) The revision of European legal framework including Article 80 TFEU to
delineate the content and meaning of 'solidarity' and Article 3 and 13 of
the Dublin Regulation;
c) The implementation of a distribution key by the Council of Ministers
through quarterly reports by EURODAC;
d) A more enforceable approach of this mechanism through the
establishment of the 'Dublin Compensation Fund' to be comprised from
funds from Member States that repeatedly take in fewer asylum seekers
to set up a supplementary financial compensation arrangement;
e) Cooperation in the external dimension apart from the internal dimension;
this should be done mainly by cooperating in search and rescue missions,
cooperating with border countries and working together for the
sustainable development of the countries of origin.
What is needed now is rapid and comprehensive reforms of the Common 
European Asylum System,1306 a fair distribution system and a reliable 
mechanism for overburdened national asylum systems which can be 
implemented through a more proactive approach of the Dublin Regulation. The 
Dublin III Regulation should distribute costs more fairly as this has also been 
disproportionally placed on the EU's external border countries. This can be done 
without having to resort to a single centralised procedure.13°7 The nature of
European asylum cooperation and European collective action regarding internal 
security is being undermined through the inequitable system, which renders it 
Bos Lawrence Peter, 'Migrant Crisis: How can EU Respond to Influx?' BBC (Europe, 7 September 
2015) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34139348> accessed 11 May 2016. 
no6 The Common European Asylum System consists of three revised directives (the Asylum 
Qualification Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive, and the Reception Conditions 
Directive) and two reworked regulations (EURODAC and Dublin-III). 
no1 Mechanisms aiding cooperation and mutual support should be more prevalent, ensuring 
comprehensive training for officials, the exchange of best practices from the European 
Asylum Support Office and better dispute resolution mechanisms 
Source: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 'Sharing Responsibility For Refugee 
Protection In Europe: Dublin Reconsidered' (2008). 
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necessary for cooperation in this policy area to evolve.1308 Quoting Migration, 
Home Affairs and Citizenship Commissioner, Dimitris Avramopoulo, 'While the 
number of migrants arriving to Europe remains high, we need to step-up the 
implementation of the agreed European response that strikes the balance 
between responsibility and solidarity',13°9 and MEP Roberta Metsola, 'If we are a 
union of shared values, we must now become a union of shared responsibility'. 
And in order to do this, 'Every Member State must play its part.'1310
1308 
1309 
1310 
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